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Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the development of human rights law in the European Union as a 
particular process of internationalization of constitutional rights. The protection of human rights, which 
originally lacked a distinct basis as a source of law in the EU, is now part of the standard operation of EU 
law before the courts of the European Union and also in the EU legislative process. The main 
distinguishing feature of the law, as developed in what could be regarded as a process of 
internationalization of law by the EU Court of Justice and embodied in the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights – a key international instrument for the protection of fundamental rights, is that beyond and in 
parallel with the aim of providing legal protection to the human rights of individuals against EU 
legislative and administrative action and the action of the Member States under the scope of EU law, 
and, thus, subjecting the use of public powers in the EU to legal controls, the protection of human rights 
in the EU has always been associated, at least in judicial interpretation, with legal, constitutional and 
governance considerations as they emerged from the broader context of European integration. Most 
evidently, EU human rights law played a central role as an instrument of consolidating the EU as a polity 
in a constitutional and political sense. 
The functionality of the law, which is a traditional feature of EU law in general, emerged as a dominant 
characteristic of anchoring the protection of human rights in the EU legal arena. The foundational 
jurisprudence of the EU Court of Justice developed the EU human rights principle in the context of 
establishing the core principles of the EU legal order and protecting its autonomy from external 
challenges. In this process, the protection of human rights as a significant legal achievement on its own 
right relevant from the perspective of securing the rule of law in the operation of the EU was 
inseparable from the more general constitutional and governance ‘motives’ pursued by the 
jurisprudence. Gradually, judicial interpretation incorporated further and further considerations 
provided by the EU context. The protection of human rights became entangled with the interest of 
effective implementation and enforcement of EU legal obligations at the national level, became 
connected with the roles assigned to individuals in the EU legal order and with EU citizenship, and found 
itself at the center of relations between the different constitutional authorities overlapping and colliding 
within the EU framework. In this sense, the constitutional rights discovered and elevated to the 
European level by the EU institutions for their own purposes became as autonomous and particular as 
the EU legal order itself. 
This paper is structured as follows. First, it analyzes the character of EU human rights as it emerged from 
judicial interpretation. It addresses especially the exposure of the interpretation of human rights law in 
general and of individual human rights to considerations provided by the particular EU constitutional 
and governance context. This is then followed by the analysis of the different contexts identifiable on 
the basis of the jurisprudence which define appreciably the interpretation of human rights by the courts 
of the EU. The article is closed with the close analysis of a recent manifestation of the interpretative 
practices pursued and the interpretative considerations used by the EU Court of Justice. The opinion 
delivered in 2015 as regards the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on 
Human Rights demonstrates clearly the acquired particularities of protecting constitutional rights at the 
European Union level. Paradoxically, the characteristics developed in judicial interpretation halted an 
attempt at its further consolidation by linking it more directly to the parallel international system for the 
protection of human rights in Europe, the law of the ECHR. 
The character of EU human rights law 
The internationalization of constitutional rights, which we now understand as EU human rights law, is, 
and remains to be, predominantly, the product of judicial interpretation as exercised by the EU Court of 
Justice.1 Reacting to internal and external pressures, the Court embarked upon a journey starting from 
the recognition of the principle that, despite the silence of the Treaties, human rights must be protected 
in the EU, primarily vis-à-vis the institutions, which led to the development of a complex body of law 
covering a broad range of rights, including the right to human dignity in a biotechnological context, the 
protection of privacy and personal data in the context of the operation of the internet, and the right to a 
fair procedure in the context of EU and Member State administrative and judicial procedures under the 
scope of EU law.2 The anchoring of the EU human rights principle, which is now recognized among the 
values of the Union in Article 6 TEU, is as much the result of teleological interpretation giving priority to 
the functionality of law, including human rights law, in the European integration process as of the 
judicial expansion of the rule of law principle as recognized in EU law requiring that legal protection is 
provided against the use of public powers. In this process of lifting rights and fundamental freedoms 
protected in national constitutions to the European level, the body of law as engineered judicially 
became entangled with the legal, constitutional and governance considerations arising from the context 
of EU integration.3 
The need to interpret the character of EU human rights law, as it emerged from decades of judicial 
development, in this manner was recognized in academic commentary from relatively early on. The 
                                                          
1
 See the traditional general formula that the application and interpretation of human rights, as general principles 
of EU law, by the Court of Justice draw ‘inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the 
Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories’, Judgment of 18 June 1991 in Case 260/89, ERT, 
EU:C:1991:254, para. 44 and Opinion of 28 March 1996 - Accession by the Community to the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Opinion 2/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:140, para. 33. 
Weiler argued that the formula asking for ‘ideas’ common to the constitutions of the Member States, instead of 
asking for a comparative examination and a reliance on national law, enables the EU Court to develop an 
autonomous human rights law, J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries’, in N.A. Neuwhal 
and A. Rosas (Eds.), The European Union and Human Rights, The Hague, Kluwer Law, 1995, pp. 113-114. 
2 Their invention in EU law as general principles was – the EU Court of Justice lacking other legal options – a 
‘solution de dépannage’, which according to the late Pierre Pescatore, one of the founding fathers of the EU legal 
order and EU human rights law, enabled the EU judiciary to fulfil its functions with a ‘broad view of its mission’, P. 
Pescatore, ‘Written Communication “The Protection of Human Rights in the European Communities”’, CMLRev 9, 
1972, p. 79. 
3
 Protecting the autonomy and supremacy of EU law was one of the main rationales followed, which, however, 
provides only a partial explanation for the judicial protection of human rights in the EU, see G. de Búrca, ‘The 
Language of Rights and European Integration’, in J. Shaw and G. More (Eds.), New Legal Dynamics of European 
Union, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 39. 
argument was made most comprehensively by de Búrca who argued that the role of human rights in the 
EU cannot be assessed without reference to its complexity which follows, among others, from the 
character of the different rights protected, the actual context in which human rights are involved and 
their different features, and the actual place and impact of the right invoked in that particular 
environment.4 In this light, particular legal developments, as overseen by the EU Court of Justice, such as 
the definition of the scope of human rights in the EU, the calibration of judicial deference – towards EU 
policy and legislation, the EU administration, Member State policy and legislation and Member State 
administration and judiciaries – in human rights cases, the judicial balancing between competing human 
rights and between human rights and competing interests, and the general positioning of EU human 
rights vis-à-vis constitutional rights at the national level and international human rights law, must be 
examined, even by lawyers, having regard to the considerations and agendas influencing the 
interpretative practices of the EU Court of Justice. 
Human rights law in the EU, despite the Charter and its ever increasing legal influence5 and despite the 
importance of human rights protection as provided by EU legislation,6 is shaped and defined 
predominantly by judicial interpretation as exercised by the courts of the European Union with 
reference to the broader and narrower constitutional and governance context of the EU itself.7 The body 
of law, thus, created pursues a busy, multi-tiered agenda governed partially by functional and 
instrumental impulses, by constitutional considerations specific to the EU as a polity, and by principles 
requiring the effective as well as the lawful operation and development of the EU and its legal order.8 
Even the original judicial recognition of the constitutional principle that EU legislation and administrative 
action must be subjected to human rights requirements, which was later extended to cover the conduct 
of the Member States under the scope of EU law, can be associated with multiple agendas. On the one 
hand, it ensured that the EU operates, just as its Member States, subject to the rule of law and human 
rights requirements, thus mending the incomplete EU constitutional architecture as established by the 
original Treaties. On the other, the anchoring the rule of law and the protection of human rights as the 
core principles of the EU legal order enabled the further, constitutionally more robustly underpinned 
pursuing of the ambitious aim that the implementation and enforcement of common EU policies, and 
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the process of European integration itself, are secured by the use of the machinery of law both at the EU 
and the member State level under principles requiring the effective fulfilment of EU legal obligations 
and the effective protection of the corresponding individual rights provided by EU law.9 
From the perspective of the EU legal order and the protection of human rights therein, the anchoring of 
the EU human rights principle in the early formative jurisprudence and its application in later larger 
cases, such as Kadi or Opinion 2/13,10 also meant their entrenchment as autonomous, self-defining 
regimes. The first judgments which addressed the protection of human rights in the EU raised this issue 
in the broader constitutional context of securing the autonomy of the EU legal order and defeating 
claims for competing authority by domestic constitutional orders.11 The responses were framed with 
reference to the earlier mentioned functional considerations of ensuring the effectiveness of common 
policies and securing, as a related priority, of compliance with EU legal obligations by the Member States 
in the national arena. In these rulings, the protection of human rights was, thus, used, beyond their 
immediate application in adjudicating challenges against EU action or against the conduct of the 
Member States, as an instrument – as an ‘existential requirement’12 –in the much larger scheme of 
developing the EU into a polity different than any previous system of transnational relations. The 
protection of human rights was meant to stand for more than offering legal protection to individuals 
and subjecting public powers to legal restraints; it was essential for securing the effectiveness of 
governing and administering the EU at the national level and, in parallel, it contributed to reinforcing the 
constitutional qualities of the EU legal order and the legitimacy of EU action. 
With the EU’s rule of law principle overburdened with constitutional, governance and political demands 
and considerations,13 it is hardly surprising that the protection and enforcement of human rights in the 
EU, primarily as regards the EU institutions, could not remain within the narrow confines of ensuring the 
legality of EU legislative and administrative action. The rule of law and the EU human rights principle, 
which are necessarily interrelated as one being the specific manifestation of the other, respond in 
judicial interpretation to the same considerations arising from the EU legal, constitutional and 
governance context and face similar limitations as to their influence and as to the related judicial 
functions.14 The rule of law, interpreted so as to emphasize the functionality of the principle for the 
European integration process, was responsible for the functional interpretation and application of 
human rights in the EU. Human rights law also influenced the rule of law principle in the EU. The 
interpretation of human rights in a particular EU interpretative context, for instance in the context of 
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the multi-layered EU judicial system where EU’s particular right to effective judicial protection is 
enforced as interpreted having regard to the particularities of that context by the EU Court of Justice, 
stretched the meaning of the rule of law by forcing the principle to endorse the particular agenda 
pursued in that particular EU context.15 
The original exposure in judicial interpretation of the protection of human rights in the EU to the 
functional considerations dictated by the European integration process,16 which outside of the EU 
context may not emerge as relevant, and the ensuing instrumental use of human rights within the legal 
order in the interest of European integration led the way to a further opening of the texture of EU 
human rights law to considerations following from its broader context. Some of these support the 
functional reading of human rights in the EU that they form integral part of the broader legal mechanism 
in place to ensure the effective development of common policies and the effective enforcement of EU 
legal obligations. Enhancing the quality of EU law, especially to meet requirements under the rule of 
law, and ensuring that the values protected by human rights are recognized and safeguarded by law in 
the EU, although not entirely independently from the functional objective pursued, were, however, also 
given relevance in interpretative developments before the EU courts.17 Overall, the main considerations 
arising from the EU context influencing the EU human rights jurisprudence include ensuring the 
effectiveness of EU governance and administration, including in particular the effective enforcement of 
EU law, entrusting national courts with roles in the application of EU law and designating, in parallel, 
their position in the multi-layered EU judicial system, securing the integrity of EU legislation and the 
corresponding governance structures with special attention paid to the balances achieved in EU 
instruments between their human rights objectives and the competing regulatory objectives, and 
developing a balanced relationship with the parallel constitutional authorities, both internal and 
external and national and European, especially with the ECHR system and its law. 
Academic commentary has by-and-large recognized this complexity and context-dependence of EU 
human rights law as developed in the jurisprudence of the EU Court of Justice. In examining the origins 
of the judicial protection of human rights in the EU, the protection of human rights was interpreted as 
an instrument introduced to secure the acceptance of the supremacy principle in the Member States 
and also as a response to the challenges based on domestic constitutional principles against the 
autonomy and the core principles of the EU legal order.18 Protecting human rights in the EU was argued 
to be a judicially engineered solution so as to relieve the pressure arising from the ‘divided 
sovereignty’19 between the EU polity and the Member States and an ‘act of self-preservation’20 for the 
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emerging supranational sovereign that we now call the European Union. It was argued to serve the 
broader agenda of furthering legal integration in Europe21 and it was held to be inspired, in part, by 
concerns for the effectiveness of the EU legal order and, in part, by other pragmatic considerations of 
governance on the European level.22 Miguel Maduro, writing on human rights as general principles of EU 
law, made the highly relevant claim that human rights in the EU have a ‘double constitutional life’.23 In 
his interpretation, this means that, on the one hand, human rights were used to enable the 
consolidation of the EU constitutional order by offering stability and restraint, in particular, by way of 
introducing a rights language and an avenue of control of EU legislative and administrative action. On 
the other, their application was kept flexible intentionally so as to enable human rights to contribute to 
the construction and development of the EU polity and accommodate demands arising in the process of 
European integration.  
In Douglas-Scott’s more critical interpretation, the jurisprudence of the EU Court of Justice has been 
manipulating human rights for purposes other than their protection24 and has been introducing ‘ulterior 
agendas’25 into judicial interpretation, which meant that, ultimately, human rights law has been 
exploited in the interest of expanding EU governance into new areas.26 She argued that the protection of 
human rights in the EU (human rights as protected in the EU) is a ‘floating concept’ which is open to all 
application and interpretation which may follow from its context.27 Similar claims were put forward by 
Ian Ward who criticized the minimalism of the early, foundational case law,28 which meant that the 
recognition of the EU human rights principle was not an act of unqualified judicial embrace of a human 
rights agenda, but rather a calculated judicial response which regarded the commitment to the 
protection of human rights as an instrument capable of contributing to the constitutional consolidation 
of the EU polity. A similar character of EU human rights law was pointed out in Toth’s much less critical 
work which argued that the Court enjoyed the best of two worlds: human rights were available to 
consolidate the EU constitutional order and they could be interpreted and applied flexibly ‘in the best 
interest of the Community’.29 The context-dependence and flexibility of EU human rights law, when 
criticisms that judicial administration of human rights in the EU left the law insufficient, ill-defined, 
ancillary, and dependent upon the intake of cases30 are taken seriously, indicate major flaws in the 
development and state of the system. 
The critical literature also pointed out that the openness of the jurisprudence to considerations arising 
from the broader context resulted in an often ambiguous and uneven jurisprudence,31 which left only a 
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definition, B. de Witte, ‘The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Human 
residual role for the protection of rights32 and which failed to locate the place of human rights in the EU 
polity.33 The early critiques of the jurisprudence, disillusioned by the pragmatic ambitions of the Court, 
reprehended especially the instrumental use (the ‘manipulation’) of human rights ‘so as to accelerate 
the process of legal integration’, and they maintained that human rights are not protected ‘for their own 
sake’ and that the jurisprudence had failed to accord them a ‘pre-eminent status’.34 The rebuttal of the 
latter criticism, which argued that human rights indeed receive adequate protection in the EU, could not 
avoid admitting that the human rights jurisprudence of the EU may only develop from what is available 
in the law and what was available as a matter of values and ideology at the different stages of European 
integration.35 This latter assessment has many things in common with the criticism which argued arguing 
that EU human rights law lacks a solid orientation and held that the EU human rights principle has 
unclear parameters and equally unstable constitutional and conceptual foundations leaving much 
uncertainty regarding the actual legal and political limitations imposed by human rights in the EU.36 
These meant that the causes of the shortcomings of the system of human rights protection in the EU 
must be found inside the EU polity which is responsible for creating a distorted system of human rights 
protection where the institutional priorities of the EU are given more weight than the substantive, 
value-generating aspects of protecting human rights.37 
Securing the autonomy of the EU legal order was recognized as the motivation for the judicial protection 
of human rights in the EU in the famous passage in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft which contended 
that EU law may only be subjected to its own legality requirements and taking into account 
constitutional requirements established at the national level would jeopardize its integrity.38 Opinion 
2/94 formulated the same arguments – this time in relation to the ECHR – in a more delicate manner 
and placed emphasis primarily on the constitutional significance and implications of introducing 
substantial changes from outside to the system of human rights protection in the EU.39 The 
constitutionally defining choice between EU and international human rights law as the standard of 
protection under EU law in Kadi was also made with reference to maintaining the autonomy of the EU 
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legal order and securing the integrity of the constitutional principles of EU law.40 The autonomy of the 
EU legal order was a central component in the Strasbourg court's assessment of the protection of 
human rights in the EU in Bosphorus, which regarded sustaining the legal and other achievements of the 
EU as an important form of regional integration of states as supporting the leeway granted for the EU 
institutions in the protection of Convention rights.41 
The introduction of a human rights principle in the process of constructing a constitutional identity and a 
legal order suited for the ambitious supranational polity, nevertheless, entailed – inevitably – developing 
and pursuing a human rights agenda – no matter how limited – for the European Union. The new 
constitutional principles generated legal changes within the polity which required a response from the 
EU Court of Justice – the architect of the new legal order – to keep the newly empowered polity under 
control.42 It was suggested that the EU human rights principle was prompted by the ‘arrogation of 
power’ to the EU which resulted from the judicial creation of power-shifting doctrines, such as 
supremacy, direct effect and implied powers, which development clearly indicated that the use of 
powers acquired by the EU will not be limitless.43 The necessity for the legal containment of newly found 
EU powers, as rationale for the protection of human rights, was recognized in the judgments in Nold and 
Hauer44 in the judicial principle, which was also reiterated in Opinion 2/94, that respect for human rights 
is a condition for the legality of EU measures and that their observance must be enforced.45 The political 
endorsement of the principle was achieved in the 1977 Joint Declaration laying down a commitment for 
the institutions of the then European Communities to respect human rights in the exercise of their 
powers and in pursuance of the aims of the EU in general.46 The principle was later elevated to 
constitutional status by virtue of ex Article 6 TEU (now Article 6 TEU) furnishing the EU institutions with 
binding constitutional boundaries for their conduct and offering a constitutional basis for the jurisdiction 
of the EU courts to enforce human rights. 
The EU human rights principle was, thus, presented as a consolidating principle for the emerging EU 
polity and offered an institutional recognition of the rule of law as a foundational principle for the new 
legal order. It allowed the jurisprudence to interpret human rights as instruments capable of supporting 
the constitutional foundations of the new legal order as well as containing the new legal order by 
formulating institutional duties and institutional constraints for European governance. The Court in Kadi 
made it particularly clear that the judicial protection of human rights is a constitutional fact, a 
cornerstone of EU constitutionalism which must not be compromised.47 The jurisprudence of the Court 
made the protection of human rights ‘integral, inherent, transverse’ in the functioning of the EU polity, 
which should form part of all objectives, functions and powers of the EU,48 and opened the gate for 
general constitutional changes affecting accountability and responsibility in the EU and anchored judicial 
review on the legal and institutional map of the EU. EU human rights law, together with other 
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components of the rule of law in the EU, gave shape to the EU legal order and also to European 
governance. This was seen as human rights providing a certain, limited public morality for the EU.49 
The character of EU human rights law was also shaped by the limitations arising in connection with the 
jurisdiction and the judicial role assumed by the EU Court of Justice in human rights matters. 
Fundamentally, the judicial protection of human rights is subject to constraints imposed by what may be 
called as parallel constitutional authorities operating in the EU legal space. The constraint may come 
from internally – from the constitutional authority of the Founding Treaties, the EU legislature and the 
EU administration, or from externally – from the constitutional authority of the Member States and of 
directly or indirectly binding international commitments.50 In general, the jurisprudence duly recognizes 
these limitations and, as a main characteristic of EU judicial practice, exercises deference to these 
parallel constitutional authorities.51 Mainly, this entails accepting that the assessment of the matter 
raised in individual cases involving human rights either falls to a different constitutional authority or it 
needs to be carried out having regard to considerations arising from a parallel constitutional authority. 
The EU Court of Justice would, thus, refuse to interfere with policy choices reflected in EU legislation, 
with the balances struck between human rights and competing interests and rights in EU instruments, 
with decisions serving the effective conduct of EU procedures, or would express trust towards the 
assessment carried out by national authorities under national law and towards national courts which 
may be given the task of making the final assessment under EU law of interferences with human rights. 
Reliance in the EU jurisprudence on legal authorities in national or, much more frequently, in the law of 
the ECHR is another important manifestation of this practice.52 
This relevance of parallel constitutional authorities, both internal and external, for the jurisprudence has 
had the important consequence of EU human rights law being interpreted and applied in a multi-layered 
setting where national constitutional laws and international human rights law continue to seek to 
influence the law produced and applied in the EU. This became evident as early as the judgment in 
Internationale Handelsgesellshaft where the challenge from the constitutional protection of rights at the 
national level was repealed and the primacy enjoyed by EU law over national constitutional provisions, 
including constitutional rights, was confirmed.53 The judgment in Kadi, Opinion 2/94 and, ultimately, 
Opinion 2/13,54 analyzed below, provide further examples of this interpretative development particular 
to EU human rights law, which is under pressure, mainly in order to protect its self-proclaimed 
autonomy, to seek approval from, or, at least, to coexist in a harmonious relationship with, other 
constitutional actors, such as national constitutional courts or the European Court of Human Rights, in 
the form of exercising deference towards national constitutional requirements, or of borrowing 
regularly from the ECHR jurisprudence.55 This character of EU human rights law, whereby its relations 
with parallel bodies of human rights law influence its interpretation, is markedly reflected in the legal 
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commentary discussing the requisite standard for the protection of human rights in the EU which would 
satisfy the European as well as the diverse national constitutional requirements.56 
Other commentators addressed this multi-layered, ‘relational’ character of EU human rights law more 
directly. In their interpretation, the EU constitutional order, including the protection of human rights 
emerged as a result of a discursive relationship between the EU and national legal orders based on a 
dialogue between the EU and the national courts.57 Wedged between parallel constitutional orders on 
the European and national levels, EU human rights law was illustrated as the product of judicial practices 
which recognize the demands of the parallel constitutional orders and which provide appropriate 
responses to those demands. It was never convincingly established, however, that the EU Court of 
Justice was ever equipped with a toolkit which enabled it to carry out the task of generating human 
rights law in a ‘reciprocal relationship’ with parallel constitutional orders, and that the interpretative 
tools which were actually available to the Court, especially the comparative approach,58 were suitable to 
create a human rights law which is not simply ‘parasitic’ or ‘purely derivative’ but which was created 
successfully by means of a genuine constitutional dialogue.59 Despite these empirical shortcomings, 
Perez’s detailed analysis of judicial dialogue as a model for the evolution of EU human rights law was 
right to make the claim that this way the ‘normative authority’ and the legitimacy of the EU Court of 
Justice’s involvement with the protection of human rights can be ensured.60 
The interpretative contexts of EU human rights law 
EU human rights law was characterized above as a product of the interpretative practices of the EU 
Court of Justice which, beyond the immediate need to ensure the lawful operation of the EU polity 
through the protection of human rights, responded to the broader demands of the EU’s constitutional 
and political construction and of the specific legal and governance considerations arising in the EU 
polity. It, thus, seems that reservation in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft that the protection of 
human rights must be ensured having regard to the structure and objectives of the EU61 had the direct 
consequence of the narrower and broader context of the protection of human rights in the EU having an 
impact on their interpretation. As already raised, many of the interpretative considerations arising from 
these different contexts are linked to the functional agenda of ensuring the effectiveness of EU legal 
obligations and of the related governance structures. Others relate mainly to the EU judiciary 
determining the boundaries of its human rights jurisdiction vis-à-vis the different internal and external 
constitutional authorities in the European constitutional space. Their influence on judicial interpretation 
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amounts to two major interpretative reactions: judicial deference and judicial balancing between the 
imperative of legal control and the interest of effective legislative and administrative action.62 
The primary interpretative consideration for EU human rights law following from its legal, political and 
governance context is the rule of law principle. As already discussed, the protection of human rights is a 
manifestation of the rule of law in the EU and it finds its conceptual basis in the EU's rule of law 
principle. The interpretative relevance of the rule of law is manifold. Its formal aspects find expression in 
the EU Court of Justice interpreting and applying human rights so as to control the legality of EU action 
and to hold actors accountable for the breach of the law.63 The rule of law is also responsible for the 
unconventional usages of human rights in the EU. Under the general effectiveness requirement of the 
EU, the rule of law pursues multiple, often contradictory agendas in the construction of the EU as a 
polity and this circumstance is channelled into EU human rights law called to appreciate the functional 
demands of EU law and governance.64 The conflicts between the conventional constraining and 
unconventional constitutive aspects of the rule of law in the EU are matched by the corresponding 
tensions between the different uses of human rights in the EU arena.65 
In the context of EU economic regulation and the law of the Single Market, EU human rights law is 
interpreted with reference to the fundamental question what constitutes appropriate regulation from 
the EU and from the Member States when they act under the scope of the law of the Single Market. In 
this regard, human rights are applied by the EU Court of Justice so as to determine the margin of policy 
and regulatory discretion reserved for the EU legislator and for the Member States.66 In majority, judicial 
interpretation focusing on the complex and often contradicting policy priorities pursued by the legal 
measures under scrutiny led to near complete deference to legislative discretion and treated the 
corresponding human rights claims accordingly.67 The relevant judgments were clearly aware of the 
necessity of preserving the integrity of complex legislative and regulatory arrangements and were 
preoccupied with determining the legitimacy and the scope of judicial assessment in enforcing the 
requirements regarding the design and quality of regulation, which follow from EU human rights law.68 
The increasing regulatory activity in the EU in the field of human rights protection presents another 
distinct interpretative context for EU human rights law. The relevant EU measures regulate the scope 
and substance of human rights, identify the rights and public interest considerations which compete 
with human rights, and lay down boundaries for public and private action by establishing balances 
between competing rights and interests.69 The judgments, which most often dealt with legal challenges 
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against the particular balance struck between the protection of human rights and the competing 
interests and rights, and sometimes with the implementation of human rights requirements in the 
measures in question, were dominated by the EU Court of Justice deferring heavily to the EU legislators 
original determination of the relevant human rights issue as represented by the provisions of the legal 
measure under challenge.70 Judicial interpretation, thus, dutifully followed the general scheme and 
structure adopted in those measures for the human rights regulated, or it accepted the specific 
provisions determining the relevant human rights requirements as adequate. Judicial assessment stayed 
within the framework provided in the relevant instruments for the balancing exercised between human 
rights and the competing interests and rights and respected the compromises established by the EU 
legislator between the policy and human rights objectives of the measure in question. Human rights law, 
as applied by the EU Court of Justice, on the whole tends to give way to the intent of the EU legislator as 
regards the protection of human rights in the particular policy context. In the few instances, when the 
Court assumed jurisdiction to assess and correct the human rights arrangements laid down in EU 
legislation,71 does not challenge this trend as the aim of judicial intervention was to ensure that the EU 
instrument in question and the related governance system, following some minor interpretative 
adjustments, can be maintained. 
The EU’s multi-layered judicial system combining the EU courts and courts at the Member State level 
had a profound impact on the interpretation of the EU’s rather peculiar72 right to effective judicial 
protection and effective remedies. The complex interpretative considerations arising from this context, 
made particularly complicated by the complementary relationship between the rule of law and the right 
to effective judicial protection, resulted in interpretative practices which rely on interpreting the multi-
layered judicial system of the EU as a single73 coherent system. On the one hand, this meant that the 
shortcomings of judicial protection before EU courts were sought to be remedied in judicial 
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interpretation by seeking alternative avenues of redress, primarily before national courts.74 On the 
other, it entailed an anxious scrutiny, as regards the participation of national courts in the EU judicial 
system, of solutions which could reconcile the interest of the effective enforcement of EU law with the 
autonomy available at the national level for regulating and administering the domestic justice system.75 
The operation of national courts and their participation in the EU judicial system, thus, became central 
to the interpretation of the right of effective judicial protection and effective remedies, which, then, 
revolved around the issue of the deference owed towards the Member States and around their 
responsibilities and obligations in the EU judicial system.76 
EU administrative procedures and infringement procedures, conducted before the European 
Commission, are responsible for very peculiar developments in the interpretation of otherwise fairly 
standard procedural rights and guarantees by the EU courts.77 In EU competition enforcement 
procedures, the effective conduct of these procedures and the effective use of the discretion made 
available to the Commission to achieve the effective enforcement of EU competition law dominated the 
framing of the relevant rights and guarantees, especially the rights of the defence, and their 
enforcement.78 Similar considerations played role, although in a very different context, in the 
interpretation of the defence rights of the Member States as participants of infringement procedures 
which were quire readily subsumed to considerations of administrative and broader policy effectiveness 
characterizing the conduct of these particular procedures.79 
As raised earlier, human rights are interpreted by the EU Court of Justice in a multi-layered environment 
whereby the existence of parallel constitutional authorities – at the national, the European and at the 
international level – bears relevance for the protection of human rights in the EU.80 Also, human rights 
need to be interpreted and applied in the various multi-layered legal and governance constructions of 
the EU,81 for example in the EU judicial system consisting of the EU courts and the courts of the member 
States. Regarding the first context, human rights in the EU are understood as having a ‘relational’ 
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character which manifests in interpretative practices of borrowing from other constitutional locations or 
in judicial deference to their authority and to the autonomy and discretion of actors located there.82 In 
the second interpretative context, the main issue is whether all actors should be allowed jurisdiction to 
control the operation of the system and what institutions and processes are available to maintain its 
integrity.83 As mentioned earlier, in the EU’s multi-layered judicial system the place and the role of 
national courts serve as the fundamental interpretative consideration in the jurisprudence. 
The relationship of EU human rights law with ECHR law provides a peculiar multi-layered interpretative 
context for the EU jurisprudence. The two legal orders are joined in a relationship of mutual observation 
which manifests in interpretative approaches informed of developments in the other legal order.84 The 
interpretative considerations arising from the parallel existence of EU and ECHR law affect the entire EU 
jurisprudence, although not in a uniform manner. They include the interpretative pressure of divergence 
from ECHR law, which is responsible for the interpretative reaction of alignment, and the interpretative 
consideration of flexibility as available under the margin of appreciation doctrine in ECHR law, which 
together shape EU human rights law.85 Alignment to ECHR law, under the pressure of potential 
divergences between the parallel legal orders, manifests in direct borrowing from the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human rights and in other less explicit practices of alignment.86 The jurisprudence 
is also aware of the circumstance that alignment is a necessary precondition for EU human rights law 
being able to exploit the autonomy provided for the development and application of human rights 
under the flexible ECHR framework, as indicated especially in the ECHR’s ‘Bosphorus-principle’.87 
The character of EU human rights law as an impediment to its consolidation 
The character developed for EU human rights law by way of judicial interpretation which exposed the 
law to considerations arising from the broader EU context had a direct influence on the EU Court of 
Justice’s controversial legal obstruction of the Union’s accession to the European Convention on Human 
Rights.88 Paradoxically, the Court, which championed the cause of consolidating the EU legal order and 
the protection of human rights therein by means of securing in law its autonomy and protecting its core 
constitutional principles, shied away from the further consolidation of EU human rights law by bringing 
it under the scope of the parallel international system for the protection of constitutional rights in 
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Europe, the law of the ECHR.89 Equally paradoxically, the legitimization of the internationalization of 
constitutional rights, which is EU human rights law, by accession to the ECHR, seeking which was 
regulated as a distinct aim for the EU in Article 6(2) TEU, was rejected on account of the threat posed to 
the integrity and autonomy of the EU constitutional order90 by its legally ordered exposure to further 
internationalization under the scope of ECHR law.91 Opinion 2/13 also identified a deep rift between the 
different interpretative considerations influencing EU human rights law and, thus, between its different 
uses in the EU context, namely between the commitment to uphold the rule of law and protect human 
rights and the interest of securing the effective operation of common policies and the effective 
enforcement of EU legal obligations. 
The opinion was not the first occasion when the EU legal order, including EU human rights law, was 
confronted with the contradictions within its own system of commitments. As already discussed, the 
earlier, Opinion 2/94 rejected, having regard to the constitutional and political state of the Union (then, 
the EC) at that time, that accession to the ECHR could take place lawfully under EU law.92 When 
declining that the European Community would have competence to make that move, the Court argued 
in essence that accession would challenge the integrity of the EC legal system and subject its operation 
directly to a ‘distinct international institutional system’ and to the rules enforced by that system.93 The 
constitutional setting for the protection of human rights in the EU had changed considerably since then. 
On the one hand, Article 6(2) TEU imposed a constitutional obligation on the Union to seek, without 
affecting the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties, accession to the ECHR. Although 
formulated with a strong element of conditionality, this Treaty provision provides that being exposed to 
controls as exercised by a parallel international system for the protection of human rights and being 
subject to its rules cannot alone serve as the basis for denying the legal possibility of the EU acceding to 
the ECHR. On the other, with the adoption and the entry into force of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
rights the protection of human rights in the EU acquired an even more solid and autonomous 
constitutional footing within the EU legal order. In parallel, the relevant jurisprudence of EU courts, 
which, as a norm, has regard to and borrows from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
rights, matured considerably.94 Finally, rulings, such as those delivered in Kadi,95 indicated a reinforced 
autonomy of and a marked internal closure in the law of human rights in the EU.96 
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In Opinion 2/13, the Court again rejected that accession to the ECHR would be possible under EU law. 
The opinion, which highlighted a number of legal shortcomings which were left unaddressed or were 
inadequately addressed in the legal preparation of the accession process,97 established much more 
assertively than Opinion 2/94 that the accession as prepared by the EU institutions as required by Article 
6 TEU failed to give due respect to the fundamental principles of the EU legal order in general and EU 
human rights law in particular, and that it was not ensured that these internal legal principles 
constituting the legal order of the Union would not be jeopardized upon accession by virtue of its direct 
legal consequences.98 It was made evident that the protection of human rights in the EU may only be 
provided lawfully and constitutionally when the legal and constitutional framework developed by the EU 
Court of Justice in its jurisprudence and by the Treaties is respected and maintained. Transgressing 
those internally determined boundaries by way of exposing EU law and EU human rights law directly to 
the obligations of the ECHR and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights may only be 
permissible under EU law in case the current framework is abandoned, or duly amended, or when the 
peculiarities of that framework are duly catered for, if that is possible, in the legal regulation of the 
accession. 
The opinion largely relied on the conceptual framework established in the judgment in Kadi. That ruling, 
which in effect contradicted the arguments supporting the position the EU Court of Justice hoped to 
secure for EU law vis-à-vis national law and national constitution law in Costa and Simmethal,99 
constructed a relationship between international law and the EU legal order which rejected the 
openness of the latter towards considerations or pressures raised externally.100 The Court, based on 
these premises, declared the unquestionable autonomy and inviolability of the EU legal order and the 
system of the protection of human rights therein. Autonomy and inviolability also provided the 
principled basis of the legal assessment of the legal particulars of the accession process. It was held that 
the undertaking of obligations under the ECHR through accession may only be realized legitimately 
under EU law, in case the autonomy of the EU legal order and the inviolability of the related principles 
governing the effective enforcement of EU law were adequately secured.101 The Court made it 
particularly clear that the Treaty-required accession to the ECHR, which is expected secure broader 
constitutional benefits for the EU legal order, may go ahead only when the original fundamental 
interpretative context of EU human rights law – that the protection of human rights plays a significant 
role as a system-constituting instrument in the establishment and the subsequent consolidation of the 
EU polity – is given sufficient recognition.102 
The reference to Kadi as the most relevant authority and the ensuing legal reasoning clearly meant that 
the opinion refused to reconsider the constitutional and, thus, the legal interpretative foundations of 
the EU legal order and the protection of human rights therein. While it is difficult to contest that the 
protection of human rights bears direct relevance for the lawful operation and for the overall legitimacy 
of any legal order and that exposure to an international body of human rights law and an institutional 
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system established for the enforcement of those rights places the integrity of any legal order under 
pressure, the internal enclosure of a legal order on these grounds fails to recognize the positive 
implications of opening up that legal order to international (human rights) law for the exact same 
constitutional considerations. Arguably, as intended by the makers of the new Treaties, although Article 
6(2) TEU does not make this explicit, accession to the ECHR will have the effect of enhancing the lawful 
operation and the legitimacy of the EU legal order and the filtering of human rights violations with the 
help of the ECHR by the European Court of Human Rights will enable the EU legal order to restore its 
integrity undermined by such violations. Obviously, the EU Court of Justice did not reject these 
considerations in its opinion as being irrelevant; it was more worried that EU human rights law will lose 
its connection with its very own context and be governed, instead of the complexity of considerations 
arising from that context, by a more reduced formal legal arrangement under the single constitutional 
clause provided by Article 6 TEU. 
The threat posed by accession to the ECHR to the current system of human rights protection as 
exercised by the EU courts must not be underestimated. There is no guarantee that the EU 
jurisprudence and the body of law thus created would not be placed under pressure from a less context-
driven interpretation of rights by an external institutional framework. The EU human rights principle 
itself, as developed in the founding jurisprudence, could attract legally established criticisms on account 
of the obvious linking of the protection of human rights to the legal consolidation of the constitutional 
principles which, in effect, claim an absolute priority for the effective enforcement of EU legal 
obligations and, thus, the effective operation of law in the EU’s multilayered governance system. The 
position carved out for effectiveness in EU law may not be completely compatible a more balanced 
approach which may follow from human rights law where the interest of effectiveness in law and in its 
enforcement needs to be measured against competing rights claims. EU human rights law may also 
struggle with protecting the judicial deference exercised towards parallel constitutional authorities in 
the EU legal space. While the ECHR system has its own principle – the margin of appreciation doctrine – 
and practice governing judicial deference under the Convention, there is no guarantee that EU and 
Member State regulatory and governance would receive the same deferential judicial treatment under 
ECHR law.103 Much depends on the application of the ‘Bosphorus-principle’ which recognized 
international cooperation among States and the setting up of regional systems of inter-State 
cooperation as an interest which needs to be given consideration in the context of protecting human 
rights.104 
For the EU Court of Justice’s arguments to really convince, the opinion should have concretized the risks 
and effects which would follow from accession to the ECHR capable destabilizing the EU legal order and 
challenging its identity and integrity.105 In light of the current treatment available under the ‘Bosphorus-
principle’, which recognizes a conditional autonomy for the EU legal order and EU human rights law 
therein, it is not particularly clear how opening of the EU legal order to direct influence and direct 
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control by the ECHR as a source of international human rights law would actually jeopardize the 
fundamental, essentially functional premises of the EU legal order.106 As suggested earlier, the opinion 
did not consider whether the EU legal order would benefit from ECHR accession complementing, 
potentially with values, its core functional ethos.107 Furthermore, the opinion, despite the example given 
by the ‘Bosphorus-principle’, failed to permit the same preliminary trust towards the operation of the 
ECHR system as that provided towards the protection of human rights in the EU under the Convention. 
The EU Court did not consider allowing the ECHR system to promote its own interpretative 
considerations as regards the protection of human rights in the same way as the European Court of 
Human Rights recognized the ability of the EU Court of Justice to develop its human rights jurisprudence 
autonomously in the particular context of the EU polity. This choice has particular relevance as without 
permitting ECHR law to impose its interpretative considerations on EU human rights law it is difficult to 
imagine under what conditions may accession to the ECHR be legally permissible under EU law.108 
Conclusions 
The development of EU human rights law by the EU Court of Justice provides an example of the 
internationalization of constitutional rights under a busy agenda. It took place in a very particular 
context and in a very particular time period, which resulted in the legal, constitutional and governance 
context of the European Union subjecting the interpretation of rights to the peculiar considerations 
arising from there. The exposure of the law to the considerations arising from its difficult constitutional 
and governance environment meant that human rights law became responsible, beyond the protection 
of individuals and controlling in law the use of public powers under the scope of EU law, for the 
constitutional construction and consolidation of the EU polity, and was drawn into giving effect to (…). 
Paradoxically, the characteristics developed in judicial interpretation for EU human rights law halted its 
further consolidation by integrating it more fully under the parallel international system for the 
protection of human rights in Europe, the law of the ECHR. Unless sufficient legal assurances are given 
that the autonomy and the fundamental principles of the EU legal order will not be jeopardized by 
accession to the ECHR, the enrichment of EU human rights law with interpretative considerations other 
than its own, which are relevant for the protection of human rights, is not permissible under EU law. 
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